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Plaintiff-Appellant Garth Youd submits this Answer to 
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and the invitation of the Clerk of the Utah 
Court of Appeals dated January 29, 1990. 
BACKGROUND 
Garth Youd brought this action to recover for respon-
dents' negligent prosecution of an action on behalf of Youd 
against Zions First National Bank ("Zions"). The action against 
Zions was based on Zions' improper reissuance of two certificates 
of deposit to appellant's father, Wilford Youd, and to his 
daughters. 
Respondents admitted their negligence in the represen-
tation of appellant, but disputed the issue of damages. As a 
result, the action focused on whether appellant would have been 
successful in its underlying action against Zions. Both parties 
moved for summary judgment, and the trial court ruled that Utah 
Code Ann. S 75-6-112 protects Zions from liability in the trans-
action as a matter of law. 
Garth Youd appealed the summary judgment ruling, claim-
ing that a material issue of fact exists as to whether Zions had 
reissued the $10,000 certificate of deposit to Garth Youd before 
Wilford Youd's contrary instructions. Appellant also disputed 
the legal conclusions of the trial court, arguing that his 
possession and due presentment of the $10,000 certificate of 
deposit entitled him to payment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7QA-3-116, that Wilford Youd was wrongfully reissued the cer-
tificates of deposit because he failed to make a "proper request" 
as required by SS 75-6-108 and 75-6-101, and that Zions was lia-
ble for conversion of the $10,000 and $15,000 certificates. 
Respondents countered by arguing that the UCC did not 
apply because no "presentment" occurred, that Wilford Youd's 
request was proper, that no issue of material fact existed as to 
the reissuance of the $10,000 certificate of deposit, that there 
was no claim for conversion because no bailment occurred, and 
that, even if a bailee/bailor relationship was created, Zions 
acted properly in following Wilford Youd's directions. 
In its recently-issued opinion, this Court ruled that 
the UCC does not apply because the certificates were not "nego-
tiable instruments" as defined by the UCC. The Court also con-
cluded that the certificates of deposit were ambiguous as to 
whether they were joint accounts in both Garth and Wilford Youd. 
It was determined that Wilford Youd's intent in creating the 
accounts must therefore be examined. If Wilford Youd did not 
intend to create joint accounts, then Garth Youd's claims are 
groundless and it is irrelevant whether S 75-6-112 applies. If, 
on the other hand, the fact finder concludes that Wilford did 
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intend a joint account, the legal issues surrounding the 
reissuance of the certificates and the application of S 75-6-112 
must be considered. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING REHEARING 
Respondents now seek a rehearing, arguing that the 
application of Section 75-6-112 to protect Zions from liability 
does not depend on whether the accounts were joint or single-
party accounts. 
Appellant finds himself in the difficult position of 
agreeing with the court's decision to reverse and remand, but 
disagreeing with the basis for that decision. Due to our concern 
that remand to the lower court on the issue suggested in the 
Court's opinion would not result in a satisfactory lower court 
resolution, appellant joins respondents in seeking a rehearing. 
Be it noted, however, that the following reasons in support of 
rehearing differ greatly from those set forth by respondents: 
1. Neither party on appeal disputed the factual issue 
of whether the certificates of deposit were ambiguous as to the 
nature of their ownership. Appellant has consistently claimed 
that the certificates are clearly joint accounts because they are 
payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth Youd." Respondents also relied 
on the factual premise of joint ownership in their argument for 
the application of § 75-6-112, which only applies to multiple-
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party accounts. Nonetheless, the Court determined that nothing 
on the face of the certificates reveals joint ownership and that 
they are therefore ambiguous. Consequently, the Court has 
remanded the action for a determination of Wilford Youd's intent 
when he created the accounts. Though we commend the Court's 
reversal of the lower court's erroneous summary judgment ruling, 
we respectfully urge the Court to reconsider the basis for the 
reversal consistent with the disputed facts raised on appeal, 
i .e. , whether the $10,000 certificate of deposit was reissued as 
a single-party account in Garth Youd's name. Even if the Court 
determines that there is no dispute as to the reissuance of the 
$10,000 certificate, we would ask that the Court evaluate the 
flaws in the lower court's legal conclusions which were raised on 
appeal. 
2. The Court's conclusion that Wilford Youd's intent 
is critical in determining the applicability of S 75-6-112 under-
mines the expressly-worded purpose of SS 75-6-108 and 75-6-112, 
which is to discharge financial institutions from having to 
inquire as to the beneficial ownership of multiple-party 
accounts. A remand to the lower court for the purpose of analyz-
ing intent will undoubtedly result in a second appeal. 
3. Plaintiff seeks review of the lower court's legal 
conclusion that S 75-6-112 applies to protect Zions from 
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liability under the facts of this case. Plaintiff reasserts the 
arguments briefed and argued in this appeal against the present 
application of § 75-6-112. Appellant argues in his Brief that 
the $10,000 certificate was duly reissued in Garth Youdfs name 
alone at his request, thus creating a single-party account. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 20. Zions' subsequent reissuance of both 
certificates at the request and in the name of Wilford Youd was 
therefore not a payment on a multiple-party account, and 
S 75-6-112 does not control. 
4. Again, relying on the undisputed fact that the 
certificates of deposit were joint accounts of which Garth Youd 
was a payee, appellant's entrustment of the certificates to Zions 
gave rise to a bailee/bailor relationship which obligated Zions 
to exercise due care in complying with appellant's instructions. 
Zions breached that duty and clearly repudiated appellant's own-
ership rights by extinguishing appellant's ownership interest in 
both certificates and replacing them with certificates in the 
names of Wilford Youd and his daughters. Such actions support 
appellant's claims of negligence and conversion against Zions. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE BASIS FOR THE COURT'S REMAND IS LEGALLY 
AMISS AND BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE COURT'S 
REVIEW. 
Plaintiff feels it necessary to respectfully question 
the grounds upon which the Court reversed and remanded the lower 
court's summary judgment ruling. We hesitate to dispute a result 
sought on appeal, but the instructions accompanying the Court's 
reversal and remand will undoubtedly cause need for a second 
appeal and further expense if not presently reevaluated. Plain-
tiff seeks a rehearing while stressing his position that other 
very tenable grounds for reversal exist as set forth below and in 
the Brief of Appellant. 
Plaintiff questions the Court's remand on scope of 
review grounds and legal grounds. 
A. The Factual Issue Upon Which the Court 
Reversed and Remanded the Case Was Not 
Disputed by the Parties to the Appeal. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for 
summary judgment if "no genuine issue as to any material fact" 
exists. The presence of a dispute between the parties as to a 
material fact disallows the granting of summary judgment. Bill 
Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1978). It fol-
lows that when a fact is not disputed by the parties, it cannot 
serve to defeat summary judgment. 
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The court concluded that the certificates of deposit 
were ambiguous as to ownership, thus requiring a factual inquiry 
into Wilford Youd's intent when he created the accounts. How-
ever, both parties have conceded that the certificates were joint 
accounts. Throughout this action, defendants have relied almost 
exclusively on Utah Code Ann. $ 75-6-112, which applies to pro-
tect financial institutions from liability for payment to a party 
of a multiple-party account. Respondents' Brief on this very 
appeal sets forth a separate argument stressing the fact that the 
certificates are joint accounts under Utah law. Brief of Respon-
dents, p. 10. 
Appellant has also consistently argued that the certif-
icates are clearly joint accounts, as evidenced by the fact that 
they are payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth Youd." 
The parties' summary judgment motions were an attempt 
to get beyond potential factual disputes and focus on the legal 
issues in this case. It became apparent from those motions that 
the parties could not agree on the factual issue of reissuance, 
but no dispute arose as to the joint ownership of the accounts. 
The Court's remand on the "intent" issue will require unnecessary 
litigation concerning undisputed facts and delay consideration of 
the truly disputed factual and legal issues in this case. See 
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Reliable Furn. Co, v. Fidelity & Guar, Ins., 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 
1965). 
B. An Analysis of "Intent" In Determining 
the Applicability of Section 75-6-112 
Undermines the Express Purpose of the 
Statute to Avoid Such an Inquiry. 
The Court's instructions on remand to determine Wilford 
Youd's intent in establishing the accounts creates a disturbing 
circular argument and undermines the purpose of the statute which 
seeks interpretation in this action. 
Utah Code Ann. S 75-6-108 states that: 
Financial institutions may enter into 
multiple-party accounts to the same extent 
that they may enter into single-party 
accounts. Any multiple-party account may be 
paidr on request, to any one or more of the 
parties. A financial institution shall not 
be required to inquire as to the source of 
funds received for deposit to a multiple-
party account, or to inquire as to the pro-
posed application of any sum withdrawn from 
an account, for purposes of establishing net 
contributions. 
(Emphasis added). Section 75-6-112 provides in relevant part: 
Payment made pursuant to Section 75-6-108 
. discharges the financial institution 
from all claims for amounts so paid whether 
or not the payment is consistent with the 
beneficial ownership of the account as 
between [the] parties. . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
The express purpose of these provisions is to allow 
financial institutions to pay out funds to one party of a 
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of the Court's published opinion, the duty to inquire into the 
intent of the parties has been revitalized whenever the account 
does not expressly state that it is owned jointly. It is no 
longer enough to meet the requirements of a joint account set 
forth in $ 75-6-101(4). We respectfully submit that the Court's 
opinion undermines the purpose of section 75-6-112 and, as 
claimed by defendants, removes the statutory shield of liability 
provided to banks by the provision. 
II. THE COURT'S OPINION DID NOT CONSIDER THE ONLY 
DISPUTED ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT RAISED BY 
APPELLANT, I.E., WHETHER THE $10,000 CERTIFI-
CATE OF DEPOSIT WAS REISSUED TO GARTH YOUD AS 
A SINGLE-PARTY ACCOUNT. 
The Court's opinion did not discuss the disputed fac-
tual issue raised by appellant on appeal. Appellant argues that 
there was no resolution in the lower court of the issue of 
whether Zions followed Garth Youd's request and reissued the 
$10,000 certificate in his name alone. This fact is critical in 
determining the applicability of S 75-6-112 to protect Zions from 
liability. If the certificate was reissued in Garth's name alone 
as requested, then S 75-6-112 would not apply to protect the bank 
for payment from the reissued single-party account. Zions would 
thus be liable for its subsequent reissuance of the certificate 
to Wilford Youd, who would no longer be a party to the account. 
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"Request" means a proper request for with-
drawal, or a check or order for payment, 
which complies with all conditions of the 
account, including special requirements 
concerning necessary signatures and regula-
tions of financial institutions . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
In light of the above provisions, Section 75-6-112 does 
not provide protection to a financial institution which complies 
with the request for withdrawal of funds that is not made accord-
ing to the terms of the account. The terms of the two certifi-
cates of deposit at issue are listed on the face of each certifi-
cate. According to these terms, for payment to be made, the 
certificates must be 1) presented to Zions; 2) surrendered to 
Zions; and 3) properly endorsed. It is undisputed that Wilford 
Youd's "request" consisted of a telephone conversation with a 
Zion's employee wherein he orally requested that Garth Youd's 
name be removed from the certificates and be replaced by his 
names and the names of his two daughters. Wilford Youd did not 
present or surrender the certificates to Zions, nor did he 
endorse either of the certificates. Zions followed Wilford 
Youd's instructions despite their clear noncompliance with the 
payment terms of the certificates. Because Wilford Youd's 
request was not a "proper request" as required by S 75-6-101, 
Zions is not entitled to the protection of § 75-6-112. 
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questions can be considered by this Court without remand to the 
trial court, and respondent respectfully seeks this review. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant joins with respon-
dents in requesting that the court rehear the issues in this 
case. 
DATED this /"*- day of February, 1990. 
A 
. HASLAM 
HOWARD C. YOUNG 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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